BASIC STATISTICS

Of the 10,053,000 people living in Jordan:
- 40% of the population under 15
- 63% under 30
- 20% between 15-24
- 62% in the productive age (15-64)

6.1% of children have a moderate and 1.3% a severe disability
20% of the children are multidimensionally poor
14% of Jordanian families lived in poverty in 2010

YOUTH

52% of youth aged 15-29 years were found to be neither employed nor in education or training (NEET) in 2016
53% of 15-29 year old workers are employed in the informal economy
8% of surveyed youth (18-24) years have searched for volunteer activities over previous year
28% of youth (18-24) years participated in the last parliamentary election in 2018
20% of youth participated in student union elections

99% youth literacy rate

49% of youth between 15-19 years are unemployed, whereas
39% from 20-24 years are unemployed
39% of Jordanian youth aged 15-29 were found to be neither employed nor in education or training (NEET) in 2016
Rationale: UNICEF Jordan’s ‘localization’

• Looking for cost efficiency, ownership and sustainability in order to provide a better rationale for high humanitarian response costs.
• Shift towards greater emphasis on strengthening the national systems at all levels.
• Build resilience of national institutions and communities against the protracted or emerging crisis.
• Enhance relevance based on what is needed at community.
• Shift from focus on refugee children to a broader vulnerability based approach for all vulnerable children regardless of status, ability or nationality.
• Humanitarian development nexus.
Localisation Evidence in Figures

- Overall funding to all parties has been declining since 2018, however a bigger proportion of funding will go to the government and NNGOs.

- While in 2016 most of partners were INGOs, but there are now almost twice as many NNGO (19) than INGO (10) partners.

- There has been a steady increase in government support since 2017 – evidence of the shift towards national capacity building and system strengthening.

- Direct implementation has accounted for more than 40% of transfers since 2016, and expected to continue to do so in the coming years.
Shift in Fund Allocation (per cent)

Note: 2019 figures are the estimation that is extracted from work plan 2019.
Case: Makani (‘My place’)

- Makani design was based on a comprehensive, multi-sectoral approach to service delivery where provision of alternative education channels, safe learning environment and child well-being under one roof was enhanced by psycho-social assistance and life skills.

- Started within the context where thousands of refugee children were not enrolled in schools in Jordan in 2015 (the number of Syrian students not enrolled in formal and non-formal education as of Dec 2018 was approx. 97,000).

- As of July 2019, 150 Makani centers are currently operational (22 in refugee camps Azraq and Zaatari, 51 in ITS and 77 in Host).

- Makani ‘localization’ has taken place in three prong approach;
  - Scaling up the partnership with the government (Ministry of Social Development);
  - Scaling up the partnership with NNGOs (NNGOs increase - from 50% in 2015 to 100% by August in 2019);
  - Direct implementation (BDC) in refugee camps (shifted from 100% INGOs in 2015).
Key Lessons Learned

• Entrusting implementation to the entities which are deep rooted in local communities, possessing deeper knowledge and understanding local contexts boosted confidence among service recipients (parents and children).

• Partnering with local NGOs allowed much flexibility and efficiency in implementing humanitarian operations due to less rigid rules and regulations.

• Direct implementation increased relevance, Accountability to Affected Population (empowered direct beneficiaries) in refugee camps, and job opportunities and skills enhancement of local population in host community (thus, promoting ‘social cohesion’ through mitigating tension between host communities and refugees).

• Heavy investment to initial capacity building pays off in a long run.
Key issues and challenges - both persistent and new issues

• Local NGOs often have limited capacity to mobilize fund from international donors/communities (hard to overcome dependency - about 85% fund coming from UNICEF).

• Weak or lack of capacity in risk management.

• Government’s lengthy approval process for local NGOs to receive fund from UNICEF.

• Government involvement may depend on the values and policies promoted at the time – may not be the priority in a long run or out of ‘mandate/scope’.
Key recommendations for moving the localisation agenda forward

• Establish measurement and success benchmark (e.g. % fund to be channeled to local NGOs).

• Ensure human rights based approach / code of conducts to protect the most vulnerable population (human rights as a core value).

• Package ‘localization’ strategy with appropriate capacity building, risk management as well as fund-raising strategies.

• Be aware of ‘hidden’ localization, i.e. INGO sub-contracting NNGO.

• Contextualize localization - may not be always the best option in the country.

• Take progressive approach depending on ‘localization readiness’.

• Establish a coordination mechanism for local NGOs (avoid duplication and unnecessary competition).

• Do not overburden local NGOs with reporting obligations (‘RBM’ costs and is labour intensive).

• Share the UN’s risk assessment approach (HACT) among different agencies/institutions.

• Factor ‘localization’ from the very beginning of intervention with a good exit strategy.
Thank you